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and sociological problems in the location 
of  science 
Steven Shapin 
Over the past two decades broadly geographical sensibilities have become 
prominent in the academic study of  science. An account is given of  tensions in 
science studies between transcendentalist conceptions of  truth and emerging localist 
perspectives on the making, meaning and evaluation of  scientific knowledge. The 
efficient spread of  scientific knowledge is not a phenomenon that argues against the 
applicability of  geographical sensibilities towards science but actually calls for an 
even more vigorous project in the geography of  knowledge. 
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That the academic study of  science owes anything  and logic. That is the obstacle faced by  the geo- 
at all to the sensibilities and resources of  geogra-  graphical sensibility towards science and, arguably, 
phers is a remarkable circumstance.'  Of  all forms  towards any body  of  knowledge which counts as 
of  cultural practice the geographical - and, more  truth for the relevant culture -whether mathemat- 
generally, the spatial or local - perspective on the  ics and science today or Christian  religion in the 
natural  sciences seems  most  difficult to  sustain.  European past. Truth is -and, arguably, always has 
After  all, both  common  and philosophical  usage  been - the 'view from nowhere' and the claim that 
testify to the very nature of  authentically scientific  knowledge  is  geographically  located  is  widely 
ideas as disembodied and their scope as universal.  taken  as a way  of  saying that the knowledge in 
That, indeed, is  one way  in which  we recognize  question is not authentically true at all." 
ideas as scientific, compared  to  folk knowledge,  It is against this background that the rise of  a 
political thought, religion, ideology  and science's  geographical perspective on science in recent years 
poor relations in the less favoured suburbs of  the  is so remarkable.4 Starting in the early 1970s, we 
academic grove: sociology, history, even geography  have  had  studies  of  local  scientific  cultures, 
itself.  national or regional, notably including a body of 
Emile  Durkheim,  for  example,  contrasted  the  detailed work on science in the Scottish Enlighten- 
local imprint borne by religious and lay belief with  ment.5 This  was  followed  later  by  a  revival  of 
the universality  of  science: 'the truths of  [modern]  nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century interest in 
science', he wrote,  'are  independent of  any local  the question of  nationally varying styles of  science 
~ontext'.~ And,  while  post-Popper  philosophers  (for  instance,  Scottish  versus  English  styles  of 
were willing to acknowledge that the production of  mathematics and physics; the German versus the 
scientific ideas was thoroughly bound up with the  American styles of  genetic^).^ 
psychologically  idiosyncratic  and  the  culturally  And then, from the mid-1980s, the geographical 
variable, they nevertheless insisted that the context  sensibility towards science became philosophically 
of  justification - the  transformation  of  idea  into  deeper. It began to press beyond matters of  social 
knowledge - was a matter of  context-free reason  organization and stylistic presentation, seeking to 
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to  be  attended  to  in  order  to  understand  how 
scientific knowledge  was  made,  how  it  secured 
credibility,  how  it  travelled.  A  pluralist  sensi-
bility towards the nature of  science flowed  from 
the  work  of  Thomas  Kuhn,  as  developed  by 
sociologists of  science whose work  Kuhn  subse- 
quently di~owned.~  - Science was not one thing 
conceptually and methodologically unified, as the 
seventeenth-century moderns and their  followers 
proclaimed;  it  was  a variety  of  practices  whose 
conceptual identities were  the  outcomes  of  local 
patterns of  training and ~ocialization.~  One could 
no more hope to become a competent member of 
the  relevant  scientific community by  reading  its 
texts  and  methodological  pronouncements  than 
one could  learn  to  be  an English  gentleman by 
reading  a  book  of  manners.  And  that  was  one 
reason  why  sociologists  of  science  turned  from 
the questionnaire and the armchair to participant 
observation  in  the  laboratory.  If  understanding 
was  the  aim,  then  there  was  no  alternative  to 
being  there,  being  where  knowledge  was 
made.9 
Kuhnian pluralism about scientific knowledge, 
and about how science was made, maintained and 
transmitted,  was  therefore  an important way  of 
opening up the possibility  of  geographical  sensi- 
bilities. The extent to which these sensibilities have 
flourished in science studies is amply represented 
in  historical  and  sociological  writing  from  the 
1980s. An issue of  the journal Science in  Context in 
1991 was devoted to 'The place of  knowledge'; the 
proceedings  of  a  1993 conference  on  'Territorial 
themes  in  the  history  of  science'  will  soon  be 
published; there is already one collection of  essays 
on  the  laboratory  setting  and  another  is  in  the 
works.1° Some of  the contributors to these volumes 
find inspiration in the work of  Scandinavian and 
British  geographers,  sociological theorists  - no-
tably Anthony Giddens -who have taken on board 
aspects  of  this  geographical  work,  and  architec- 
tural  theorists  of  the  built  environment  and  its 
consequences for social interaction."  Others have 
been  taken  with  Foucault's  encouragement  to 
understand  knowledge/power  conjunctions  as 
inscribed in space: 
Once knowledge can be analysed in terms of  region, 
domain, implantation, displacement, transposition, one 
is able to capture the processes by which  knowledge 
functions  as a  form  of  power  and  disseminates the 
effects of  power." 
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Much of  this work in science studies has been 
beautifully  summarized by  David  Livingstone in 
a recent  issue  of  Society  and  Space.13 Students of 
science owe much to geographers and it is flatter- 
ing to learn that Livingstone thinks that historians 
of  geography might possibly learn something from 
us. If  so, it is mainly through showing some of  the 
possibilities inherent in geographical work. 
Geography and the travels of  knowledge 
I want  briefly  to  describe  a  few  of  the  themes 
represented in recent science studies work, to note 
how such work deploys geographical perspectives 
and how it confronts problems of  its own making, 
problems  which  may  seem to show the limits of 
spatial and localist sensibilities but which, I think, 
identify a plausible way forward. Out of  a possibly 
much greater range of  topics, I want to select just 
two, which I will call travel and meaning. The first, 
I will have to deal with schematically; the second, I 
will illustrate with a story. 
Suppose one simply took for granted - as many 
philosophers and even some sociologists of  science 
do not - a whole body  of  recent  empirical  and 
theoretical  work  showing the local, situated  and 
embedded nature of  science. That is to say, suppose 
one regarded it as established beyond  doubt that 
science is indelibly  marked by  the local and the 
spatial circumstances of  its making; that scientific 
knowledge is embodied, residing in people and in 
such  material objects as books  and instruments, 
and  nowhere  else;  and,  finally,  that  scientific 
knowledge is  made by  and through  mundane -
and locally varying - modes of  social and cultural 
interaction.  If  one granted all this, one would be 
treating  the  'localist'  or  'geographical'  turn  in 
science studies as a great accomplishment - telling 
us  a  series  of  important  things  about  science 
which  previous  understandings  have  systemati- 
cally ignored or denied. 
I agree with this judgement  and I do think that 
such work - indebted as it is to formal and infor- 
mal appropriations of  geographical resources -is a 
considerable achievement.14  And yet I also want to 
say that it is still incomplete and that it is in danger 
of  missing  something  very  important  about 
science. The  problem  here  is  not  that  the  geo- 
graphical sensibility has been taken too far but that 
it  has  not  been  taken  far  enough.  We  need  to 
understand not  only how knowledge is made in Placing the view from nowhere 
specific  places  but  also  how  transactions  occur 
between places. 
The point  to  which  I want  to  draw attention 
concerns the issue of  tmvel. If  science is indeed a 
local product, how does it - or rather  some ver- 
sions of  it - travel with what seems to be unique 
efficiency? How does a proposition or a procedure 
produced  in  one  place  come  to  spread  across 
the world? One  appeal of  the  grand  modernist 
narratives of  reason, reality and method was the 
table-thumping response they offered to potential 
questions about the travel of  science. Such knowl- 
edge spreads so robustly across the world because 
it is true and/or because it travels along the chan- 
nels  carved  out by  unambiguous and automati- 
cally transferable methodical practices. Knowledge 
which is not true, or which is not so methodically 
grounded, does  not  spread.  What  more  do you 
need to know? 
You can, I think, plausibly reject these modernist 
answers to questions about travel but you cannot 
plausibly  reject  the  phenomena  to  which  they 
offered an explanatory response. Science is locally 
produced  but  it  does  travel  with  very  great  ef- 
ficiency. How does it do that? If  you are sceptical of 
the modernist responses, what interesting accounts 
can  you  give  of  scientific travel? And  how  do 
spatial sensibilities figure in such accounts? 
The work of  Bruno Latour and his followers has 
opened  up  one  particularly  significant  line  of 
thinking about scientific travel.'%nowledge  and 
technique travel insofar  as they  are institutional- 
ized and standardized. The graph, the map and the 
book represent one set of  vehicles for the efficient 
translation  of  relatively  unmodified  knowledge 
from  place  to  place; the  thermometer  represents 
another. When knowledge of  the wide world can 
be reduced  to the scale of  a table-top  and when 
mechanically produced and virtually identical cop- 
ies can be placed on table-tops everywhere, then all 
can (potentially and in principle) know the same 
world  in  the  same ways.16 And  when  the  ther- 
mometer becomes simply necessary for work of  a 
range of  practical communities, then the physical 
knowledge embodied in it becomes durable and, 
ultimately,  incontestable.  If  you  want  to  under- 
stand  the  robustness  and the  speed  of  scientific 
knowledge, you want to understand how it - and 
the things in which it is embodied -are distributed 
and held  stable. That  is one justification  for  the 
militaristic  and imperialistic  language  that  is  so 
characteristic of  Latour's  work: he wants to draw 
attention to the ways in which patterns of  military 
domination,  colonialism  and  worldwide  trade 
have  established  channels  which  integrate  the 
world and which  standardize its knowledge and 
its  practices.  The  suggestion  is  that  the  wide 
distribution of  scientific knowledge flows from the 
success of  certain cultures in creating and spread- 
ing standardized contexts for making and applying 
that knowledge. Trace how  the thermometer and 
its uses travelled across the world. Track how the 
European-style  schoolroom  travelled  across  the 
world.  Domination, drilling and  disciplining  are 
said to be the keys to understanding how techno- 
scientific knowledge spreads from the local to the 
global. 
However, the 'dog'  that - so to speak - 'doesn't 
bark'  in  Latour's  picture  of  scientific travel is  a 
conception  of  normative  order.  The  Latourian 
account appears all natural fact and no moral fact. 
And for that reason, I suspect that it is at best an 
incomplete response to questions about the travel 
of  scientific knowledge. Domination,  drilling and 
disciplining are, I think, powerful means for effect- 
ing the spread  of  knowledge but they  are quite 
costly means. Nor does attention to such processes 
pick up some much more routine and pervasive 
means for transferring knowledge from person to 
person and from place to place. 
Recent science studies work on trust -including 
some of  my own - also proceeds from a point of 
view  on  science  systematically  rejected  by  the 
modernist  tradition  going  back  to  the  seven-
teenth century.17 Where such moderns  as Bacon, 
Descartes and Locke proclaimed that reliance upon 
human  testimony  was  an  obstacle  to  achieving 
proper  knowledge  of  the  natural  world,  more 
recent tendencies have followed Michael Polanyi in 
appreciating both the fact and the necessity of  such 
reliance in securing and making sense of  empirical 
knowledge."  That  seventeenth-century  English 
natural  philosophers  knew  that  there  were  such 
things as icebergs and polar bears was on no other 
basis than what they were told by those who had 
seen  these  things,  for  few,  if  any,  of  them  had 
seen them for themselves. The same goes for the 
phenomena produced by Boyle's air-pump in the 
1660s, for only a small fraction of  those who knew 
such facts knew them at first-hand. And the same 
too for the knowledge a typical modern zoologist 
has of  the vast number of  animals which constitute 
that  discipline's  factual  knowledge.  It  is  proper 
usage to say that  Robert Boyle knew there were icebergs  and it  is  proper  usage  to  say  that  the 
typical modern zoologist knows the strange repro- 
ductive  behaviour  of  the  marine  worm  Urechis 
caupo, even though both fail to satisfy modernist 
criteria of  direct witness. They know these things 
as securely  as they  know  anything  else in  their 
domains and they  know them - as it were - by 
courtesy. 
Accordingly, a trust relationship is central to the 
very idea of  empirical scientific knowledge.  That 
relationship  is inscribed in space: those who have 
not seen these things know them by trusting those 
who have, or by trusting those who have trusted 
those who have. The capacity of  scientists to know 
what they do about the world is conditional upon 
finding means to bring distant things near. They 
can know the contents of  the wide world -in space 
and in time - if, and only if, they  have practical 
solvents to scepticism. Whom to trust? Answers to 
such a question will vary from place to place and 
from culture to culture but, if  there is indeed  to 
be such a thing as a body of  knowledge about the 
wide world, there must be some answer. 
The  work  I  have  been  doing  recently  on 
seventeenth-century English science has pointed to 
the gentleman and gentlemanly identity as one very 
powerful answer to the question 'whom to trust?'. 
Many (and, in some contexts, most) scientists in the 
early  modern  period  were  gentlemen  and  their 
codes  of  scientific  conduct  were  adapted  from 
those circulating in gentlemanly society. Appreci- 
ations of  gentle integrity, honour and free action 
were  available  to  warrant  belief  in  what  these 
people said about the world, including the natural 
world  to  which  they  had  access  and  to  which 
others  did  not.  Gentlemanly  identity  in  such 
cultures provided adequate grounds of  trust. 
Late twentieth-century scientists are not gentle-
men: most are not gentle and many are not men. 
Our late modern solutions to questions about the 
grounds of  trust appear to be different: they seem 
to point towards expertise and the institutions that 
produce  and  vouch  for  expertise.  But  modern 
science is no less trust-dependent  than science in 
the past  or  than  other forms of  modern  culture. 
And  arguably  it  is  more  so.  The  condition  of 
scientists  knowing  their  discipline's  knowledge, 
and of  the laity knowing what scientists know, is 
a massively important solution - or series of  sol- 
utions -to problems of  trust. That solution -and it 
has yet adequately to be characterized - is at the 
same time a solution to questions about scientific 
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travel  that have been raised  by  the geographical 
sen~ibilit~.'~ 
Geography and the meanings of 
knowledge 
Finally, I would like to tell a little story. It is a story 
about  a  short walk  I  took  several  years  ago  in 
London, a story about small-scale geography and a 
story about meaning  and some of  the sensibilities 
that historians of  ideas might employ -but almost 
never do - in their inquiries about the meanings of 
texts. 
When  Robert Boyle  lived  in London  from the 
late 1660s, he produced a number of  moral as well 
as natural philosophical tracts. Some of  these tracts 
identified  immoral tendencies  in his  society and 
offered  philosophical  remedies  for  those  tenden- 
cies. He did not, in fact, clearly specify just  which 
circles he had in mind but recent historical studies 
have  filled  in  the  gaps.  Boyle,  it  is  said,  was 
specially concerned by the radical sectarian groups 
that flourished  during the interregnum  and civil 
wars:  Diggers, Ranters,  Levellers and the  like.20 
Although  these  groups  were  quite  effectively 
crushed by the Restoration in 1660, they remained 
paramount in Boyle's consciousness -and, indeed, 
in  that  of  other  Restoration  moralists.  They 
remained,  so it  is  claimed,  a  potent  symbol  of 
threats  to  proper  Christian  religion  and  proper 
moral order. 
That is a plausible  story about the meaning of 
Boyle's texts and nothing I found out during my 
little walk counts against its plausibility. However, 
that walk presented  me with another, quite differ- 
ent,  plausible  story  about the  meaning  of  those 
texts. While the first story depends upon Boyle's 
reaction to tendencies  and behaviour with which 
he did  not  have  direct  familiarity  (so far  as we 
know he never met a Ranter in his life), the second 
story  proceeds  from  his  own  day-to-day  lived 
experience. It is about the neighbours. 
I knew that Boyle's house no longer existed but 
I knew that it was in Pall Mall, on the south side, 
almost opposite St James's Square. (Strictly speak- 
ing, this was the house of  his sister Katherine, Lady 
Ranelagh, but Boyle lived  there from 1668 to his 
death in  1691.) I set out to  find  it,  expecting  to 
see a blue and white plaque commemorating his 
residence there for almost a quarter of  a century. 
The site is now occupied by the western wing of 
the  RAC  - this  is  now,  of  course  gentlemen's Placing the view from nowhere 
club-land - but there was no plaque. Walking a 
little  further  to  the  west,  there was a  plaque: it 
commemorated not Boyle but Nell Gwyn, one of 
Charles  11's  many  mistresses. A little  further  on 
lived  two other royal  mistresses,  the  Duchess  of 
Cleveland  and the Countess of  Portland, and, at 
the  western  end  of  Pall  Mall, St  James's  Palace 
itself, where the King li~ed.~'  These were Boyle's 
neighbours,  whose  comings  and  goings  helped 
form the texture of  his daily experience during the 
years he was composing, revising and publishing 
some of  his moral tracts. 
What went on in Nell Gwyn's house - and to a 
lesser  extent  in  St  James's  Park  and  the  King's 
private garden round the back of  Boyle's housez2 -
is well-known. This was one of  the most louche 
and licentious  sites  of  Restoration  debauchery -
and at the very highest social levels. Nell's  parties 
- orgies actually - included not only the King and 
selected  courtiers but also  such Restoration  wits 
and libertines as the notorious Earl of  Rochester. 
There is also solid evidence that occasional guests 
included  Samuel  Pepys,  Christopher  Wren  and 
other distinguished Fellows of  the Royal Society, 
an  organization  which  Boyle  helped  to  found 
and  of  which  he  was  a  leading  intellectual 
inspiration.'" 
That is, the dens of  iniquity of  which Boyle had 
the  most  direct  and  vivid  experience  were  not 
those  at the bottom of  the social scale but those 
which  festered  at the  very  top,  practically  next 
door. The neighbours'  goings-on may always and 
everywhere  be  a  problem  but  these  were  very 
special  neighbours. And  about  these  neighbours 
you  did  not  complain.  Or,  if  you  did,  only  so 
circumspectly or obliquely that - as the CIA used 
to put it - 'maximum achievable deniability' could 
be  sustained.  Boyle  did  not  complain  about  the 
neighbours'  behaviour but there are good reasons 
why  he might  not  have  done  so while  offering 
general indictments of  immoral tendencies  in his 
society. That kind  of  obliqueness  was, after all, a 
pervasive feature of  Restoration social and political 
commentary. 
I do not  necessarily  offer  this as a  true story 
about the meaning of  some of  Boyle's moral texts 
but only as a plausible  one. More to the point, I 
submit the story as a token of  a possibly general 
approach to meaning  in the history  of  ideas. The 
condition of  even offering the story is an inquiry 
into - in this case, a walk in - the local setting of 
knowledge-making. And the possibility that it is a 
true  story  about  meaning  arises  from  a  theory 
about  human  affections  best  articulated  by 
Edmund Burke in 1790: 
To  be  attached  to  the  subdivision, to  love  the  little 
platoon we belong  to in  society, is the first principle 
(the germ as it were) of  public affections. It is a first link 
in the series by which we proceed towards a love to our 
country and to mankind.24 
And  the  same  applies  where  the  issue  is  not 
affection but disaffection. 
Burke's  sensibility  would  suggest that  we are 
importantly  attracted to,  or  repelled  by,  ideas as 
they  are  embodied  in  familiar  others  - kin, 
teachers,  colleagues,  neighbours. That  sensibility 
is, in my opinion, basically correct. It offers a con- 
structive  framework  for  empirical inquiries  into 
the local production of  meaning. Such inquiries, I 
think, can never be too local, and in just that sense 
the localist turn in science studies has a long way 
still to go. 
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